The Pamphlet

Introduction

The end of the Cold War heralded the end of bipolarity and, as many saw it, the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1993). With the perceived victory of liberal democracy and the UN unshackled, peacebuilding efforts intensified. The UN launched over 33 peacebuilding missions between 1989 and the end of the century (Paris, 2004). However, as further missions were deployed, mixed results led to a perception that liberal peacebuilding was failing to deliver on its intended aims. The scenes of a massacre in Bosnia, starvation and state failure in Somalia, and mass genocide in Rwanda haunted the international community, sparking debate about liberal peacebuilding’s performance and approaches. In 1999, as NATO bombs fell on Kosovo the debate intensified with Edward Luttwak in Foreign Affairs questioning the efficacy of the external intervention. Controversially, he argued that the international community should “give war a chance,” arguing that intervention had suspended the conflict and that allowing the war to play itself out was more likely to bring peace (Luttwak, 1999, p.36). Nevertheless, despite the continuing debate, the start of the new century brought new interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, with both followed by disastrous insurgencies and the eventual exit of international actors. 

The reasons behind liberal peacebuilding failures are well catalogued. Newman argues that failure is down to the “formulaic, top-down, ethnocentric” nature of interventions that fail to recognise local actors (Newman, 2009, p.42). Ginty agrees, suggesting that liberal peacebuilding has developed into “peace from IKEA; a flat-pack peace made from standardized components,” which fails to leave room for local participation in peace (Ginty, 2008, p.145). Richmond continues this thread by arguing that liberal peacebuilding has placed “rights over needs” with little focus on the well-being of local people (Richmond, 2009, p.68). Some commentators have gone even further, with Bellamy, William, and Chandler highlighting in their view the imperial overtones of liberal peacebuilding interventions, with Chandler, in particular, highlighting Bosnia as an example of international actors displaying imperial like powers (Chandler, 2006). Even the likes of Paris, an advocate of liberal peacebuilding, acknowledges that mistakes have been made. In light of criticism concerning overly hasty democratisation, he proposes that peacebuilders should prioritise “institutionalisation before liberalisation” thereby delaying changes that are often blamed for bringing turmoil to unprepared societies (Paris, 2010, p.7).

While failure assessments are aplenty, so too are the new ideas and perspectives on improving peacebuilding. Ginty proposes exploring “indigenous peace-making” whereby local peacebuilding initiatives and international ideas coalesce (Ginty, 2008). Others, like Richmond, propose a focus on finding a ‘post-liberal peace’ with the potential to focus on the ‘Everyday’ whereby international actors engage with local people to determine their requirements before setting out to implement initiatives (Richmond, 2009). Ginty and Richmond represent powerful advocates of what has become known as the ‘local turn’ whereby local actors play a more active role in peacebuilding. However, others criticise the local turn as a “makeover,” handily used to answer the problems facing liberal peacebuilding (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015, p.53). Paris questions the need for more detail, arguing that the conceptual ideas need more explanation and clarification (Paris, 2009). The debates on the local turn provide a rich seam of questions. Is the local turn a new way of thinking about peacebuilding? Does it provide a realistic alternative to liberal peacebuilding? How would the local turn be deployed in future interventions? 

In answering the title question, this essay will argue that the local turn does not present a viable alternative to liberal peacebuilding and is instead an example of paradigm maintenance rather than a paradigm shift. This essay will assert that due to the local turn’s liberal foundations, it is simply part and parcel of today’s peacebuilding toolkit, having been co-opted by liberal actors. Moreover, despite its value in highlighting the importance of local actors, some of its ideas and concepts remain too theoretical, making them difficult to codify as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding.

The first part of this essay will explain the rise of the local turn, some of its main ideas, examples of its application, and the critique the concept has encountered as it has gained popularity. The second section makes the case against the local turn as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. The final section will outline some areas for further research and answer some of the likely challenges to the argument made in this essay. 

Section One: The Local Turn

Liberal fallout

The events in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened perceptions of liberal peacebuilding, with Ginty pointing out the naive views of many who saw liberalism as some form of “magic dust that, if spread within states and economies, would produce harmony and prosperity at the international level” (Ginty, 2010 p.394). Critics such as Richmond saw liberal actors and their approaches to intervention as “Ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and confidential, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects” (Richmond, 2009, p.558). Moreover, in attributing blame for the poor performance of liberal peacebuilding, he suggested efforts were excessively focused on rebuilding the state, engaging with elites, and prioritising rights over welfare with international actors disconnected from local people and siloed in “liberal bubbles” (Richmond, 2010, p.667). The failure to engage local actors and its dangers is also highlighted by Wallis in her case study of Timor Leste. She points out that during the UN intervention, estimates showed that, “80 percent of the Timorese residing in rural areas and living subsistence lifestyles were left out of the peacebuilding process”, hampering efforts to maintain peace (Wallis, 2018, p.89).

Other critics have also focused on the lack of local engagement. In critiquing the intervention in Bosnia, Chandler argued that international actors were ‘faking democracy’ with local people excluded from the development of their state as international actors took control and made political decisions without input from the electorate or civil society. (Chandler, 2000). Richmond and Kappler also pick up on Bosnia, arguing that the EU’s peacebuilding efforts are failing due to the lack of a social contract and the ignorance and exclusion of local actors, damaging legitimacy and threatening stability. Furthermore, they point out that in the absence of EU’s recognition and empowerment of local groups, citizens have taken it upon themselves to pursue their own peacebuilding efforts (Richmond & Kappler, 2011).

Hybridity, the Everyday & Emancipation

As two of the biggest proponents of the local turn, Ginty and Richmond have called for more local engagement and ownership in peacebuilding efforts. They argue that the local turn enables local actors to create peace either on their own or in co-creation with liberal peacebuilders through reimagining “authority, rights, redistribution, and legitimacy.” (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.769). Moreover, they argue that peace would be “everyday and emancipatory” in nature with the coming together of local people to resolve conflict (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.769).

Both are proponents of hybridity whereby international and local actors interact, cooperate, resist and renegotiate for improved peacebuilding outcomes. (Ginty & Richmond, 2013). In promoting hybridity or “Top-down, bottom-up peace,” (Ginty, 2010, p.391) Ginty argues that liberal peace is already hybridized, given centuries of historical interactions. Moreover, he makes the point that today hybridity can often be seen in interventions whereby international actors focus on economic reform while local actors work on restorative peace and justice (Ginty, 2010).

Richmond sees hybridity as providing the possibility of a ‘post-liberal peace’ where power is moved down to local people to debate and determine the type of peace they want, based on their communities’ political preferences. Moreover, he regards the likely tension between local communities and international actors as positive; with local actors empowered to reimagine liberal concepts and foundations, and to hammer out their adapted versions of democracy, social contract, and even the state itself. Richmond argues that while much of this will be done at higher levels of society, it will also happen at the level of the ‘everyday.’ Explaining in more detail, he argues that local people, including those often invisible to international actors, come together to design political approaches and ideas to govern their relationship with the state and external actors (Richmond, 2010). Similarly, Ginty argues that hybrid peace is subject to resistance and will empower local people to design “alternative forms of peace” through “cooperation and contestation” (Ginty, 2010, p.403). However, neither sees hybridity as the end of liberal peace, with Richmond suggesting that hybridity and local empowerment will likely rejuvenate liberal peacebuilding (Richmond, 2010). 

However, while Ginty and Richmond are proponents of the local turn, they recognise its dangers and limitations. Ginty argues that new ideas in opposition to traditional liberal peace are likely to risk being overwhelmed by the “unrivalled coercive and economic power” of liberal peacebuilding (Ginty, 2010, p.403). Both scholars also argue that there is an inherent danger in romanticising the local turn given that it too “can be partisan, discriminatory, exclusive and violent” (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.770). While recognising the growing popularity of the local turn, they warn against co-option noting that liberal peacebuilders are “only too happy to embrace the language, though rarely the spirit, of the local turn” (Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p.779). Furthermore they higlight the temptation among liberal peacebuilders to use the local turn as justification for a minimalist approach to peacebuilding or one that places the burden largely on the shoulders of local people (Ginty & Richmond, 2013).

Practical Application 

There are numerous examples of the local turn and hybridity in action. Somaliland is often credited as an exemplary case study in local turn peacebuilding. Hagmann and Hoehne argue that following the 1991 civil war, local people including former fighters, politicians, and the wider public came together to rebuild the state including stablising the economy, establishing law and order, setting up a free and independent media and constructing a democratic government. Furthermore, they point out that these efforts were undertaken without international support or assistance (Hagmann, Hoehne, 2009). A similar case study, this time in Bougainville, is highlighted by Boege. Following its violent conflict with Papua New Guinea between 1988 and 1998 over its desire to secede, Boege lauds Bougainville for having utilised local and traditional forums and techniques to build sustainable peace. Furthermore, like Somaliland, Boege points out that Bougainville also built its democracy while not having a monopoly on state violence thereby relying on local people to maintain peace (Boege, 2008).

Returning to the Pacific, in Timor Leste, Sambary and Wassel illustrate how the ongoing conflict in various aldeias (hamlets) across the capital Dili between 2006 and 2011 was reduced through the adoption of hybridity. They present a case where previous attempts at using a customary local ceremony called ‘tara bandu’ to secure an end to violence failed. Following that failure, they point out that the International Non-governmental Organization (INGO) Catholic Relief Services (CRS) stepped in with support from the local government to conduct in-depth peacebuilding assessments and to engage directly with local actors. Furthermore, they point out that the CRS broadened its outreach and leveraged youth groups and gang leaders to foster a deeper and more impactful peace. Sambary concluded on a field visit that targeted communities remained largely peaceful five years later (Sambary & Wassel, 2018). 

The three case studies above represent a tiny fraction of local peacebuilding efforts. However, more work is being done to add further rigour to emerging concepts and ideas. Richmond has defined a set of principles for a post-liberal peace with references to the need for a social contract, a genuine understanding of the local, and a focus on “everyday life, care and empathy” (Richmond, 2009, p.579). Furthermore, he argues for an agreement from international actors not to adopt a cookie cutter approach to peacebuilding and refrain from neoliberal economic and security activities (Richmond, 2009). De Coning has also attempted to outline a new approach that is similar to that typically deployed in the world of software design. He proposes ‘adaptive peacebuilding’ as a novel way to unite international and local actors to develop peace incrementally through an “iterative process of learning and adaptation” (De Coning, 2018, p.317). Furthermore, he suggests that this new way of building peace will help local communities create peace while being comfortable with ambiguity and change. (De Coning, 2018). In addition to established effort there is also a general consensus that ongoing Ph.D. research will further help develop the local turn’s theories, concepts, and frameworks.   

Criticism 

However, critics of the local turn and its variants are relatively easy to find. For example, Paris argues that “there is no realistic alternative to some form of liberal peacebuilding” (Paris, 2010, p.340) and that ideas such as emancipatory peace lack clarity and detail (Paris, 2010). In his view, those arguing for the alternatives fail to see the inherent link their ideas have with liberalism, with Paris contending that most advocates are arguing from a liberal viewpoint focusing more on how to improve liberal peacebuilding than coming up with anything new. (Paris, 2010). Despite coming from a different school of thought, Sabaratnam argues a similar view. She suggests that eurocentrism has led many proponents of hybridity to base their thinking, concepts, and ideas on liberal ideas and concepts which she argues is demonstrated through their “nostaligia for social contract politics, welfare democracy and the liberal political subject” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p.268).

From a historical perspective, Rampton and Nadarajah suggest that ideas of hybridity are similar to those used during the colonial period when colonial powers used local actors to manage local affairs. They suggest that the call to hybridity mirrors that same historical behaviour, with hybridity acting as the solution to the problems of liberal peacebuilding. Furthermore, they challenge the notion that hybridity is emancipatory. Instead, they argue that it is very much open to “orders of mastery and domination, such as colonialism, capitalist accumulation, and majoritarian nationalism” (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2015, p.57). In other words the local turn is simply a continuation of historical behaviours. 

Critiquing from an attitudinal standpoint, Sabaratnam makes several critical points in her paper on the ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism.’ First, she argues that debates on liberal peacebuilding often suffer from eurocentrism, damaging their credibility. She makes the point that eurocentrism has led scholars to ignore local people in their research, instead focusing on debates related to frameworks and policy failures. Secondly, she highlights the “ontologies of otherness” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p.44) and the problem of binaries where the local and international may be proscribed cultural attributes that propagate harmful and inaccurate historical and eurocentric attitudes. Hameiri and Jones continue in this vein arguing that hybridity is “trapped in binaries,” (Hameiri & Jones, 2018, p.100) with advocates defaulting to unhelpful binary definitions. They argue that such definitions distort analysis and cannot attribute cause and effect in the complex world of peacebuilding. They make the case that simple binaries do not work, especially in scenarios where some locals support international intervention while others do not. Furthermore, using a case study of child soldiers in Sierra Leone they point out that the use of local / international binaries led the scholar Millar to inappropriately judge local people as not having the same care and attention to children’s welfare as would be likely in the west. (Hameiri & Jones, 2018).  Some of these issues will now be explored in more detail in the following section where this essay will argue against the local turn as an alternative.

Section Three: A Liberal Turn

This essay section argues that the local turn does not provide an alternative to liberal peacebuilding and instead represents an example of paradigm maintenance rather than a paradigm shift. The section will outline three principal arguments. Firstly, it makes the case that the local turn is built on existing liberal foundations and is therefore a modification rather than an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. Secondly, given its liberal foundations, the local turn has been co-opted by liberal peacebuilding actors to solve historical mistakes made during previous intervention efforts and to improve peacebuilding outcomes. Thirdly, evolving local turn approaches and concepts remain too theoretical, making them difficult to codify as a robust alternative. 

Built on liberal foundations 

The local turn shares common foundations and principles with liberal peacebuilding. The discourse on the local turn is laden with liberal taxonomy, including; participation, empowerment, emancipation, individual freedom, equality, human rights, representation, inclusion, civic society, social contract, and ideas of the liberal state and its monopoly on violence. The abundance of liberal nomenclature suggests the local turn is deeply embedded with liberal ideas, which would naturally limit its ability to offer a unique alternative to liberal peacebuilding. 

As the liberal peacebuilding advocate Paris suggests, many of those critiquing liberal peacebuilding do so from a liberal viewpoint, invoking liberal ideas and principles. Focusing on David Chandler and his criticism of liberal peacebuilding initiatives in Bosnia, Paris suggests the disapproval stems from Chandler’s liberal desire for local actors to have a fairer involvement in local decision-making (Paris, 2009). He adds that the critique is “rooted in a distinctively liberal set of values, emphasising self-government, political participation, and representation, and limitations on government power” (Paris, 2010, p.355). Similarly, Paris highlights Ginty’s belief that ‘indigenous peacemaking’ could be a way to improve ‘participation,’ again calling out the inherent link between liberal ideas and the principle of political participation. (Paris, 2010). Similar liberal thinking can be seen in Richmond’s outline of the ‘Everyday’ and his ideas on a post-liberal peace. He suggests that the ‘everyday’ will allow local people to develop political ideas better suited to their local environments and contexts with locally inspired versions of democracy, rights, and representative forms of government (Richmond, 2010). However, even here, the taxonomy and ideas of liberal thought are everywhere, with ‘emancipation,’ ‘self-determination’, and ‘individual political agency’ just some examples. Richmond suggests that the everyday requires the “rule of law in a constitutional setting in order to guarantee the political agency of the individual” (Richmond, 2010, p.680). Furthermore, he admits that elements of his multipoint policy plan, which include references to human rights, the rule of law, and representation, “reflect the potential of the liberal peace” (Richmond, 2009, p.579). Richmond’s desire to improve peacebuilding through local engagement extends to a new type of ‘social contract.’ He argues that the existing social contract invoked by liberal peacebuilders often fails, given its focus on the state at the expense of individuals and their welfare and the lack of appreciation for the desire of local people to determine their own type of peace. Explaining things further, Richmond stresses the need for a new social contract where local and international actors broker the type of peace they want, even if it sits outside concepts such as the liberal state. He goes on to explain the importance of local actors having the ability to define their own human rights albeit on a broader scale encompassing “emotions, culture and learning” (Richmond, 2009, p.74). While a new social contract, better suited to local conditions on the ground is worthy of consideration, its source of thinking still emanates from liberal thinking and the tradition of Locke and others of the liberal tradition. 

Nadarajah and Rampton similarly argue that hybridity is strewn with liberal peacebuilding ideas. They contend that hybridity is based on the “politics of inclusion and exclusion” (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015, p.63) while also concerned with a state monopoly on violence and ideas such as the development of a social contract which, in their view is resonant of liberal political ideas (Nadarajah & Rampton, 2015). Ginty and Richmond highlight the central liberal idea of the individual as a political entity when explaining why the local turn has been widely adopted (Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Even the ideas proposed by De Coning on local ‘adaptive peacebuilding’ stem from a liberal position. While his proposition that local people adopt a more agile approach to peacebuilding may differ from traditional approaches, it is still based on the idea that local people have more say and engagement in the process. While he does not explain how that participation occurs, some form of emancipatory process along liberal lines is likely.    

As the examples above illustrate proponents of the local turn, hybridity and the everyday are heavily influenced and remain wedded to liberal ideas, principles, and tenets. The very idea of ‘alternative’ would suggest the need for different ideas that depart from the norm and traditional thinking. In respect of the local turn’s liberal foundations it is fair to say it does not represent an alternative approach.

Liberal Co-option

Given the local turn’s apparent liberal foundations, it is hardly surprising that it has been co-opted by liberal peacebuilders and forms part of their toolkit. More critical voices against the local turn argue that it has been co-opted by liberal peacebuilding to solve the criticisms against it. Rampton and Nadarajah argue that local turn approaches have been adopted as a “makeover of international peace intervention” (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2015, p.53). They suggest that hybridity has been absorbed as a way of handling non-liberal differences and those actors that may be more likely to resist efforts by international actors. Furthermore, they suggest hybridity is more of a modification than a genuine alternative to liberal peacebuilding. Both question why hybridity is summoned at key moments, suggesting that it is a “problem-solving tool” (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2015, p.58) used by liberal peacebuilders in a similar way to those governing an empire whereby local actors are co-opted to solve local problems of legitimacy and control (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2015).

Some of the most famous instances of local peacebuilding have been heavily influenced by or directed by international actors. The Loya Jirga in Afghanistan and Nahe Biti in Timor Leste can be regarded as having been influenced and adapted by liberal peacebuilders (Ginty, 2008). Since 1923 the Loya Jirga, or ‘Grand Council,’ has played a pivotal role in Afghanistan’s governance. The inaugural meeting in 1923 endorsed the country’s first constitution, with subsequent updates agreed upon at a meeting in 1964 before sessions were again held following the US-led invasion in 2001 to approve post-war constitutional agreements. The sessions held soon after the US-led invasion had over a thousand representatives elected from the various regions throughout Afghanistan (Smith, 2019). However, despite the apparent historical thread, Ginty argues that the 2001 Loya Jirga was brought back to life by the US-led coalition to secure the approval of the Bonn Agreement and that its composition was very different. He points out that the new forum had women in attendance, restrictions on those with war crime attending, and an unwieldy number of participants making deliberations difficult (Ginty, 2008). Furthermore, Ginty argues that international absorption of apparent indigenous peace-making forums was made more obvious by the fact that the location for the meeting in 2002 was inside a NATO-built complex (Ginty, 2008). As the example of Loya Jirga shows, international actors adopted and amended local customs to fit their needs with changes in the composition of those attending or excluded adhering to liberal principles such as inclusion and human rights. 

The co-opting of the local turn can also be seen in Rwanda, where Gacaca courts were used to try the overwhelming numbers of defendants awaiting trial for war crimes. While many commentators cite the Gacaca courts as an example of indigenous justice, they fail to consider the significant influence outside forces had in evolving Gacaca beyond its historical roots. As Clark notes, in response to the genocide, the Gacaca courts were modernised through influence from foreign and liberal organizations. He highlights that the Danish Center for Human Rights partnered with the Rwandan government to drive awareness of the updated Gacaca law before the trials began. Moreover, he points out that Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF) helped to develop the manual used by those operating the courts while NGOs were invited as observers, and serious cases were automatically referred to the liberal UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Clark continues by pointing out that the Gacaca law was a “complex synthesis of western law and historical Rwandan practices” (Clark, 2007, p.30). While the Rwandan government-led efforts to establish the Gacaca approach despite international resistance, including from the UN (Clark, 2007), it is reasonable to suggest that outside liberal forces heavily influenced its operations, composition, and legal frameworks. It can be argued that despite the UN’s lack of support for choosing Gacaca as an approach, other liberal INGOs already working with the Rwandan government decided to cooperate, giving them the ability to influence and provide direction. 

As Ginty suggests, the strength of liberal peace means adoption and inclusion of the local is more likely than a “co-existence of equals” (Ginty, 2008, p.158) with the recognition that the local can help liberal peacebuilding reach areas where it struggles to make an impact, such as local justice and reconciliation (Ginty, 2008).

Another example of liberal peacebuilding absorption of the local turn can be seen in how it is increasingly referenced in official liberal documents, accords, and policy papers. As Ginty illustrates, the word local was not referenced in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace document, whereas in 2011, it was referenced hundreds of times by institutions such as the UN and the World Bank (Ginty, 2015). Moreover, Ginty points out that the language adopted by INGOs, such as “participation, local ownership, and partnership,” has now been copied and adopted by liberal peacebuilders (Ginty, 2013, p.775). Similarly, Paffenholz suggests that the local turn “is a mainstream part of orthodox peacebuilding, not a marginal one anymore” (Paffenholz, 2015, p.867) with peacebuilding actors having spent considerable effort on local strategies and providing funds to support local peacebuilding efforts (Paffenholz, 2015). 

Lost in Theory.

The local turn as a viable alternative to liberal peacebuilding is also undermined by its overly theoretical nature. As Paris suggests, many proponents of the local turn need to outline their ideas and approaches in enough detail to enable implementation or subsequent analysis. For example, he criticises both Pugh and Richmond for failing to explain in more detail how emancipatory peacebuilding would work. Furthermore, he argues that until that is done, it is difficult to ascertain whether it might be better than the existing approaches to liberal peacebuilding. (Paris, 2010). Randazzo makes a similar point suggesting that the ‘everyday’ reveals “little conceptual clarity” (Randazzo, 2016, p.1361). Even Richmond admits that the “everyday and the local are ‘fuzzy’ concepts, requiring more research in order to open up their more critical understanding of peace” (Richmond, 2009, p.570). Ljungkvist and Jastad take a similar view arguing that “conceptual fuzziness of the local still lingers” (Ljungkvist & Jastad, 2021, p.2122). Furthermore, they suggest that the local turn is based on a collection of ideas that are sometimes antithetical to one another, with a need for clarity on how to identify the local and understand its relationship with broader peacebuilding efforts (Ljungkvist & Jastad, 2021). While recognising the importance of the local in delivering sustainable peace, Kendhammer and Chandler highlight the lack of alignment on the local turn and its criticality to peacebuilding as a reason behind the dearth of workable ideas (Kendhammer & Chandler, 2021). Aside from alignment, others critise the lack of robust evidence as to the efficacy of the approaches. Paffenholz, in critiquing the local turn, suggests that the performance of hybrid peace has yet to face robust analysis and a lack of clarity as to whether it provides for better outcomes (Paffenholz, 2015). 

Section Three: Research & Criticism 

As many commentators have suggested, ongoing research will likely unearth new insights, case studies and improved frameworks. However, this essay argues that the focus should be on formulating a more shared understanding of the local, albeit not one driven by standardisation and harmonisation. While the challenge is difficult, Richmond has made attempts at this with his work on the ‘everyday’, and others should follow his example. Another area of research could focus on tackling the issue of selectivity and binaries in particular, following up on the criticisms made by Randazzo on why certain actors are chosen over others and how to correct this. 

The argument outlined in this essay will naturally provoke debate and counterarguments. Some will suggest that the local does indeed provide an alternative and that this essay has focused too readily on selecting case studies that undermine the local turn’s alternative potential. However, in answering that charge, this essay would argue that even when exploring Somaliland, which is often heralded as the local turn poster child, it is easy to challenge the idea that the local turn provides a genuine alternative. While not wanting to downplay the tremendous work done by the local people in achieving sustainable peace, it is only partially accurate to attribute success solely to local actors. As Dr Sarah Njeri, a research associate and specialist on Somaliland, argues, the country did receive liberal peacebuilding support with evidence that co-opting of local initiatives has occurred (Njeri, 2019). 

Other arguments might point out that the local turn is still in its infancy and that more research will illustrate the local turn’s viability as an alternative. In response, this essay would argue that while that might be a reasonable prediction, the local turn is already several decades old, and still remains wedded to liberal ideas and stuck in a never-ending cycle of theoretical debate led mainly by scholars of liberal persuasion. In other words, an alternative breakthrough is unlikely to come anytime soon. 

Conclusion

The local turn has significantly impacted peacebuilding debates and efforts to improve peacebuilding outcomes. Its focus on putting local actors at the heart of peacebuilding will likely correct the past failures of top-down, template-designed peacebuilding. However, despite its value in generating debate and exploring new tactics, it does not offer a viable alternative to liberal peacebuilding. Its liberal roots and co-option by liberal actors point to the local turn as an example of paradigm maintenance rather than a paradigm shift. Given its shared foundations, principles, and tenets, the local turn remains a concept and set of approaches primarily rooted in liberal thought. Notions of participation, emancipation, representation, human rights, social contract, and the state are all liberal ideas. Given that much of the thinking is generated within western locales, this is hardly surprising. Despite proponents exploring various local turn approaches and concepts, they all invoke liberal ideas suggesting, as Paris does, that advocates are more critical of the ”how” than the ”what” when implementing sustainable peace (Paris, 2010). 

Additionally, whether cynically or for more enlightened purposes, international organisations and policymakers have gone out of their way to embrace and absorb the local turn as an idea. Its inclusion in peace accords, policy documents, and rhetoric suggests that the international peacebuilding community has absorbed it. It is reasonable to claim that it now forms part of its peacebuilding toolkit. Furthermore, as the examples in Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Timor Leste suggests, the local turn is already heavily influenced and, in some cases, co-opted by liberal peacebuilding. Some of this is to correct past mistakes, while others suggest it is an attempt to offload the burden of peacebuilding from overstretched liberal actors. 

The theoretical nature of the local turn, combined with its proponent’s reluctance to define new frameworks and provide much-needed clarity, undermines the local turn’s credibility as an alternative for peace. Arguments that the local turn has too much variety to codify are reasonable, but alternative approaches to any existing paradigm require detailed explanation and clarification to enable thorough evaluation and assessment. Additionally, the lack of evidence of the efficacy of local turn initiatives combined with the more straightforward problem of attributing cause and effect makes the local turn challenging to quantify and evaluate as a potential alternative to liberal peace. As many commentators have pointed out, ongoing research may clarify frameworks and provide more evidence. However, until such time it must be concluded that the local turn is not a viable alternative to liberal peacebuilding. 

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